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J. RODNEY JOHNSON1 
The New Simultaneous Death Act 
Welcome Changes for Donative Transfers 
EVERY will that is drafted in accordance with minimum pro-
fessional standards will take into account the possibility that 
one or more of the intended beneficiaries might die prior to 
the testator or, in the case of a future interest, prior to the gift 
becoming possessory.2 Thus the reciprocal wills of husband 
(H) and wife (W) might leave everything to the other "or, if 
s/he fails to survive me," to their mutual beneficiaries. In most 
cases this provision will carry out the couple's intent without 
any difficulty. However, in those cases where H and W die in 
close succession to each other, using nothing but this simple 
survivorship provision could result in a reduction in the amount 
that their mutual beneficiaries will receive and the passage of 
a longer period of time before they receive it. Suppose, for 
example, an automobile accident where H dies instantly and 
W dies on the way to the hospital, or sometime during the next 
day or so in the hospital. Under the above will provision, 
because W did in fact survive H, W did inherit H's entire estate. 
Thus, even though W is now dead, following the administra-
tion of H's estate the residue thereof must be distributed to 
W's executor who, in turn, must administer the same proper-
ty again (along with W's original property) and distribute it to 
their mutual beneficiaries. The obvious problem in this case 
is that H's property has to be administered twice-once to W 
and then (as a part of W's estate) again to their mutual bene-
ficiaries-with a consequent increase in administrative expens-
es and overall time for complete administration.3 
Although the preceding hypothetical illustrates a time and 
expense problem of some significance, it pales in comparison 
to the problem of a complete loss or diversion of the inheri-
tance that occurs in some cases.4 For example, assume a case 
where Testator (T) is a surviving parent and Son (S) and Daugh-
ter (D) are T's children. T's will might provide for a gift of 
one-half of T's estate "(i) to S or, if S fails to survive me, (ii) 
to those of S's children who survive me or, if none, (iii) to D 
or, if D fails to survive me, (iv) to those of D's children who 
survive me." The other one-half would go to D with parallel 
survivorship provisions. Suppose next that T and S are involved 
in an automobile accident, with T dying at the scene of the 
accident and S dying on the way to the hospital, or sometime 
during the next day or so in the hospital. As the key to taking 
under T's will is "surviving T" and, as S clearly survived T, S 
(or S's estate) will take one-half of T's estate. But, as S is now 
dead and cannot personally benefit from this inheritance, the 
question naturally arises "Who is the real beneficiary in the 
sense of the ultimate recipient of this half of T's estate?" Assum-
ing S to be married, his will, if he has one, is likely to leave 
his entire estate to his spouse; if S has no will, the law of intes-
tate succession will pass his entire estate to his spouse in the 
typical case. Thus the one-half of T's estate intended for S 
passes out of T's family to a child-in-law. How does this result 
correspond with T's intent? Not at all in the stated hypotheti-
cal or in the typical case. T's intent and priorities are quite clear 
in both instances. T wants one-half of the estate to go to each 
child. If a child cannot beneficially take, T wants that child's 
half to go to that child's children or, if none, to the other child 
or, if none, to the other child's children. But, because of S's 
short period of survivorship, T's intent is frustrated and one-
half of T's estate is diverted from T's family to a child-in-law. 
The negative results illustrated by these hypotheticals would 
not occur if, instead of one dying shortly after the other, Hand 
W (or T and S) should die simultaneously. In such a case Vir-
ginia's Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (USDA) provides 
that the beneficiary is deemed to have died prior to the testa-
tor. Thus, in the first hypothetical H's estate would go direct-
ly to the mutual beneficiaries of H and W without first passing 
through W's estate, and in the second hypothetical T's estate 
would go to the next class or person named in T's will instead 
of going out of the family to an in-law. However USDA does 
not apply where persons die at approximately or substantial-
ly the same time. If there is actual survivorship for any mea-
surable period, however short, the act is not applicable. And, 
"(i)n cases in which both individuals caught in a common 
tragedy have died by the time third parties arrive at the scene, 
or shortly thereafter, the narrow application of (USDA) has 
sometimes led to unfortunate litigation in which the repre-
sentative of one of the individuals attempts, through the use 
of gruesome medical evidence, to prove that the one he or she 
represents survived the other by an instant or two."5 In one 
instance the alleged period of survivorship was one breath,6 in 
another case it was 11150,000 of a second.7 The shortest sur-
vival interval in a Virginia case having a published opinion 
was 73 minutes.' Although one finds only a limited number 
of short-interval cases in appellate litigation under USDA, the 
reason is obvious. Current law is settled that survivorship for 
even the briefest interval takes the case from under USDA. 
Thus, regardless how regrettable the outcome in a particular 
short-interval case might be, there is simply no possible rem-
edy and thus no litigation that could find its way to an appel-
late court. However, the reader is invited to take the equivalent 
of judicial notice regarding the number of short-interval sur-
vivorship cases that are regularly reported in the news.9 Fur-
thermore, an analysis of the cases and literature leads to the 
permissible conclusions that (i) cases of true simultaneous 
death have never been but so frequent, and (ii) advances in 
medical science and technology since the promulgation of 
USDA have tended to make such determinations increasingly 
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infrequent. On the other hand, the number of short-interval 
survival cases is increasing and, regrettably, USDA provides 
no assistance in any of these cases in reducing administration 
time and expense, in carrying out a decedent's probable intent, 
or in keeping property in the family. 
Standard Drafting Solutions 
The problems caused by a beneficiary predeceasing the tes-
tator have led many attorneys to routinely insert some type of 
survivorship clause in the wills and trusts that they draft. Unfor-
tunately, some of these survivorship clauses are no better than 
USDA because they deal only with the parties' "simultane-
ous" death. Thus the prior discussion of USDA's shortcom-
ings can be incorporated by reference at this point to describe 
the problems that might be faced under these wills. Other 
lawyers prefer to use a clause that focuses on the parties dying 
from a common tragedy. Although a common tragedy provi-
sion is certainly broader in scope and operation than a simul-
taneous death provision, the common tragedy provision contains 
a major flaw and, for other reasons, can be somewhat of a prob-
lem producer in its own right. 10 The major flaw associated with 
the common tragedy provision is its myopia, i.e., its failure to 
see that the time, cost, intent, and extra-family problems dis-
cussed above are not restricted to cases where the parties die 
as a result of the same tragedy. Instead, these problems arise 
whenever the parties die in close succession to each other, 
regardless of the cause. If the testator dies in Virginia in an 
accident or from natural causes on day one, and the benefi-
ciary dies in California from whatever cause on day two, the 
case will present the same time, cost, intent, and extra-family 
problems as if they had died as a result of the same tragedy. 
The real problem is the death of the parties within a short peri-
od of each other. Whether or not their deaths result from the 
same tragedy is irrelevant. 
The drafting solution to all of these problems is quite uncom-
plicated. As the common denominator of all of the described 
problems is death of the beneficiary within a short interval 
after the testator, it would appear that the rather elementary 
solution to this problem would be a survivorship "time" clause. 
A will provision simply stating that "any beneficiary who fails 
to survive me by x days shall be deemed to have predeceased 
me" would be sufficient to eliminate the above described time, 
cost, intent, and extra-family problems in all but a few cases. 
Of course the time clause can not be an absolute panacea 
because, no matter what time period is substituted for x in the 
above provision, there will be cases where death occurs on x 
plus one, etc. This minor deficiency notwithstanding, it is clear 
that, of the survivorship clauses available to the drafter, the 
time clause is the one most likely to carry out the testator's 
intent, to keep testator's property in the family, and to mini-
mize the time and expense of administering the testator's estate 
in cases where a beneficiary dies shortly after the testator. 
Enactment of USDA '91 and Its Primary Thesis 
Life was simpler when USDA was promulgated in 1940, 
and the number and variety of legal problems was smaller. 
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Since that time, however, the problems previously discussed 
in the text have evolved, and the complete inadequacy of USDA 
to resolve these problems has become apparent. These devel-
opments did not go unnoticed by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and, in 
response thereto, it recently promulgated a replacement for 
USDA-the 1991 Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (USDA 
'91). 11 Although USDA '91 differs from the original Act in 
many ways, it will not change the result in any case to which 
the original Act would have applied. Thus, in any case gov-
erned by USDA '91, where there is no sufficient evidence that 
the parties have died otherwise than simultaneously, its default 
rule still provides for the property of each party to be disposed 
of as if that party had survived the other. Instead of changing 
the original result of the original Act in cases of simultaneous 
death, USDA '91 goes beyond the operation of the original 
Act and provides for an intent-effectuating rule to operate in 
cases in which one party clearly did survive but where the peri-
od of survivorship was insubstantial. In other words, USDA 
'91 moves from a simultaneous death provision to a time pro-
vision. This feature of USDA '91, the time provision, might 
be referred to as its primary thesis. This thesis is said to be 
intent effectuating because of a belief that the typical testator 
would ordinarily prefer a gift to pass to testator's secondary 
beneficiary, even though the primary beneficiary actually sur-
vives, if that period of survivorship is so short that the prima-
ry beneficiary has neither the time to personally enjoy the gift 
nor the opportunity to make any after-the-fact disposition there-
of. This assumption certainly corresponds with the writer's 
personal and vicarious experience and, indeed, it would seem 
impossible to refute in the typical case. The only difficulty lies 
with the quantification of a time period that will be acceptable 
to everyone as the "short" or "insubstantial" period contem-
plated by the new Act. However, prior to beginning the debate 
on the appropriate period for a statutory time clause, one must 
recognize that, although no one period will satisfy every per-
son or situation, there has to be a default rule. Some choice 
must be made to govern in those cases where testator's will is 
silent, and this choice will likely require some compromise 
from advocates at both ends of the available spectrum. 
The Survivorship Period Under USDA '91. 
The survivorship period chosen for the default rule of USDA 
'91 is five days, which is expressed as 120 hours. Looking at 
the secondary question first, one might ask "Why is the time 
period expressed in hours?" The simple answer is that 120 
hours is a more precise way of stating five days and this form 
of expression will reduce the collateral litigation that is oth-
erwise predictable. For example, if A dies at 10:00 a.m. on 
Thursday, and B dies at 2:00 p.m. on the following Monday, 
how may days have elapsed between their deaths? Does one 
focus on the number of 24-hour intervals beginning at the 
instant of A's death? Does one wait until midnight of the "act" 
day and then start counting full days? Does one count both the 
"act" and "end" days as full days, regardless of how many 
unexpired hours they contain, or does one round them off to 
the nearest full day, etc.? Little reflection is required before 
most persons will accept the wisdom of stating a short period 
of time in the medium of hours instead of days. 
Coming now to the primary issue, what is the basis for select-
ing a period of five days, instead of one, or ten, or some other 
number as the default rule? The answer is based partly on 
assumption and partly on experience. First, one must keep in 
mind that the goal of USDA '91 is to pass a testator's proper-
ty on to a testator's secondary beneficiary where the primary 
beneficiary doesn't survive long enough to personally enjoy 
the gift or to have an opportunity to make any after-the-fact 
disposition thereof. The new Act takes the position that a pri-
mary beneficiary who dies less than five days after receiving 
traumatic injury (which time will most likely have been spent 
in a hospital's intensive care ward) typically will not, in this 
short period, have personally benefitted from, or made any 
after-the-fact disposition of, the property in question. But 
wouldn't this also be true ifthe time period was, for example, 
two days? The narrow answer is yes, but there is a further fac-
tor that must be considered. That factor is the prospect of com-
plete survival. One who has survived the initial trauma and 
lived for a period of at least five days will have a greater prospect 
for complete survival than would be true in the case of a two-
day survivor. Accepting this conclusion, one might logically 
extend it and ask if a time period of ten or thirty days might 
not be even more desirable as a predictor of complete survival? 
The narrow answer is yes, but again there is a further factor 
that must be considered. The longer the time period that is cho-
sen for the final ascertainment of beneficiaries, the longer the 
estate and its assets will be in a form of limbo, and this limbo 
should not be extended beyond the point where it provides a 
corresponding benefit. It is relatively easy to argue that a five-
day survivorship period would be both (i) significantly more 
predictive of complete survivorship than would a two day peri-
od and (ii) unlikely to create any significant administrative 
hardship. It is more difficult to argue that extending the peri-
od from five to ten days would be that much more helpful from 
a predictive standpoint that it would justify the increased poten-
tial for administrative difficulties that would result by dou-
bling the survival period to ten days. Such then is the argument 
based on assumption. 
The argument based on experience focuses on the use of a 
short interval survival requirement by the Uniform Probate 
Code for the last twenty-four years. Since 1969 the UPC has 
contained a 120-hour survival requirement as a condition prece-
dent to taking by intestate succession or under a will." The 
UPC has been adopted in fifteen jurisdictions since its pro-
mulgation in 1969 and the literature contains no evidence that 
this survivorship aspect is not functioning as intended. Indeed, 
it was the UPC's positive experience with its 120-hour sur-
vivorship rule in regard to testate and intestate succession that 
persuaded NCCUSL to extend this rule to survivorship ten-
ancies and all other donative transactions under the Uniform 
Probate Code in 1990. 13 And it was this successful experience 
under the Uniform Probate Code since 1969 that is the gene-
sis of the 120 hour provision found in USDA '91 . 
J. Rodney Johnson, J.D. (William and Mary), LL.M. 
(New York University), is a professor oflaw at the Uni-
versity of Richmond. Professor Johnson is a member of 
the American Law Institute, the American College of 
Trust and Estate Counsel, the National College of Pro-
bate Judges, the Virginia Bar, The Virginia Bar Associ-
ation, the American Bar Association (Chair, Committee 
on Planning and Administration of Small Estates and 
Trusts), the Richmond Estate Planning Council, the Trust 
Administrators Council of Richmond, the Christian 
Legal Society, and he serves as Virginia Liaison for the 
Joint Editorial Board of the Uniform Probate Code. Pro-
fessor Johnson is the author of Basic Will Drafting in 
Virginia, numerous articles in the fields of estate plan-
ning and fiduciary administration, and he is a frequent 
speaker at continuing legal education seminars. 
The Scope of USDA '91. 
Under present Virginia law, 14 USDA applies (i) between the 
insured and the beneficiary in an insurance policy, (ii) to sur-
vivorship tenancies, (iii) to provisions for successive sur-
vivorship between beneficiaries in a third party's donative 
instrument and, (iv) "when the title to property or the devolu-
tion thereof depends upon priority of death." In the absence 
of this last "catch-all" category of application, present Virginia 
law would not be applicable to a number of cases. A non-exclu-
sive listing of matters not included within the first three cate-
gories might include (i) beneficiary designations under an 
employer's pension, profit sharing or retirement program, (ii) 
certain joint bank accounts, 15 (iii) exemptions and allowances, 
(iv) rights under augmented estate, (v) IRAs, (vi) etc.? Even 
with the applicability of the last "catch-all" category is it clear 
that the listed transactions (and all others not specifically 
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enumerated in the first three categories) are covered? Is it clear 
that they are not covered? It is submitted that there are some 
litigable matters at this point. 
With the advantage of over fifty years of experience since 
USDA was promulgated in 1940, the drafters of USDA '91 
have largely, if not completely, eliminated these interpretive 
problems as well as others not mentioned herein. The gener-
al approach of USDA '91 is to divide the various succession 
possibilities into three categories, as follows: (i) rights of a 
statutory nature (which includes intestate succession, allowances, 
exemptions, and augmented estate), (ii) rights under a gov-
erning instrument, 16 and (iii) co-owners with right of sur-
vivorship. 17 Although there is no guarantee that the new Act's 
classification system will eliminate every possible interpre-
tive problem, it does appear to include all presently known 
concepts and to contain broad language of general application 
to handle matters that might arise in the future. 
Determining Succession-Evidentiary Concerns. 
Although it is not unusual to hear lawyers referring to the 
survivorship "presumptions" under USDA, no presumptions 
were in fact created by this enactment. Instead of establishing 
presumptions that might be rebutted by evidence to the con-
trary, the original Act created rules of substantive law to be 
applied in cases where there was no sufficient evidence that 
persons died otherwise than simultaneously. These substan-
tive rules for simultaneous death cases can be summarized as 
follows: ifthe parties are (i) the insured and the beneficiary in 
an insurance policy, the insured survives; (ii) survivorship ten-
ants, each tenant survives as to the proportion that one bears 
to the total number of tenants; (iii) beneficiaries with succes-
sive survivorship in a third party's donative instrument, each 
beneficiary survives as to the proportion that one bears to the 
total number of beneficiaries; and, (iv) in the general catch-
all category of "when the title to property or the devolution 
thereof depends upon priority of death," each person survives 
as to that person's own property. USDA does not address the 
issues of burden of proof or standard of proof in any of these 
cases, it merely provides a rule for the disposition of contest-
ed property when neither side to the controversy has sufficient 
evidence of survivorship to establish the actual order of the 
parties' deaths. 
USDA '91 not only addresses the burden of proof, it also 
establishes the standard of proof and addresses certain other 
evidentiary concerns. The first two of these matters is accom-
plished by a provision that "an individual who is not estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence to have survived the 
other individual by 120 hours is deemed to have predeceased 
the other individual." 18 Thus the new Act settles the burden of 
proof issue by clearly placing the burden upon those who would 
profit by a finding of the beneficiary's survivorship. The new 
Act also requires that the fact of the beneficiary's survivorship 
be proved by clear and convincing evidence. In addition to the 
general rules of evidence otherwise applicable, USDA '91 
makes specific provision for certain matters arising in cases 
dealing with the determination of death or status. It expressly 
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provides a standard for determining when the time of a per-
son's death is deemed to occur which, in Virginia, would be 
pursuant to the general rules of§ 54.1-2972 in most cases, and 
pursuant to Chapter 5 of Title 64.1 in cases of persons pre-
sumed dead. The new Act contains express rules governing 
the effect of copies of governmental reports, records or death 
certificates, 19 which generally provide for them to be prima 
facie evidence of relevant facts recited therein. 20 In this regard 
the new Act further provides that, in the absence of any evi-
dence disputing the time of death, such a document showing 
a time of death that satisfies the new Act's survivorship require-
ment establishes this fact by the requisite standard of clear and 
convincing evidence. In those cases where there are no gov-
ernmental reports, records or death certificates to provide prima 
facie evidence of death, the new Act provides that the facts of 
death may be established by other, including circumstantial, 
evidence. 
Exceptions 
A primary purpose of USDA '91 is to create default rules 
that would carry out the presumed intent of the typical testa-
tor in cases where a beneficiary dies very shortly after the tes-
tator. It is axiomatic that no rule of presumptive intent should 
be applicable in instances where there is an expression of actu-
al intent. Recognizing that the 120-hour rule should yield in 
such cases, the new Act contains four exceptions to its gener-
al rule. The first of these exceptions occurs in cases where "the 
governing instrument contains language dealing explicitly with 
simultaneous deaths or deaths in a common disaster and that 
language is operable under the facts of the case."21 Although 
on first reading it might appear that this exception would be 
applicable whenever a document refers to "simultaneous" or 
"common disaster" deaths, this is neither the intendment nor 
the operation of the exception. Focusing on the closing words 
of the exception, it is clear that, in addition to the requirement 
that the governing instrument contain language of "simulta-
neous" or "common disaster" deaths, there is an additional 
requirement that "that language is operable under the facts of 
the case."22 
By way of illustration, suppose H's will leaves everything 
to W but, "if W fails to survive me or if we die simultaneous-
ly," to the children of H and W. Assume further that H and W 
are involved in an automobile accident in which H dies imme-
diately and W dies 24 hours later. The general rule of USDA 
'91 will apply and, as W failed to survive H by 120 hours, W 
is treated as predeceasing Hand H's estate will pass directly 
to H's secondary beneficiaries, the children ofH and W. Why 
doesn't the first exception prevent the new Act's general rule 
from applying? Because, although H's document had language 
referring to "simultaneous" death, that language was not "oper-
able under the facts of the case." Although at first one may be 
dubious, a moment's reflection shows that this added qualifi-
cation, "operable under the facts of the case," is truly indis-
pensable to the intended operation of the new rule. As noted 
in the beginning ofthis article, there are numerous wills ofliv-
ing testators in circulation that contain ill-chosen "simultaneous" 
or "common tragedy" death clauses. In addition, as the old 
forms and formbooks continue to be relied upon, many more 
such documents are likely to be drafted in the future. In this 
context, to allow such references, standing alone, to defeat the 
new rules would frustrate both (i) the legislative purpose in 
enacting USDA '91, and (ii) the intent of the typical testator. 
Thus, in order to adhere as closely as possible to its basic 
premise, realization of probable intent, the new Act does not 
create an exception to its general rule for cases where the gov-
erning document merely refers to simultaneous death or death 
in a common tragedy. It reserves the exception for cases where 
this language is operable under the facts of the case. 
The second exception to the new Act's general rule focus-
es on those cases where "the governing instrument expressly 
indicates that an individual (is or) is not required to survive an 
event, including the death of another individual, by any spec-
ified period."23 As noted earlier, many lawyers are expressly 
dealing with the underlying problems in these death in close 
succession cases by using some type of time clause. In such 
cases, whether survivorship for a period of time is specifical-
ly required or specifically negated, whatever the document 
says should, and will, control. This second exception would 
also seem to be the basis for recognizing the "reverse-pre-
sm:nption" of order of deaths that is frequently employed in 
the tax wills of wealthier clients. 24 The third exception is con-
cerned with those cases where an attorney has drafted for the 
absolute maximum period of contingency allowed by the Rule 
Against Perpetuities. To prevent an unintended failure of the 
gift by the addition of five more days in such a case, the third 
exception prevents the general rule from applying if "the impo-
sition of a 120-hour requirement of survival would cause a 
nonvested property interest or a power of appointment to be 
invalid under the Rule Against Perpetuities."25 
The fourth and final exception to the new Act's general rule 
operates when "the application of a 120-hour requirement of 
survival to multiple governing instruments would result in an 
unintended failure or duplication of a disposition.''26 The pri-
mary operation of this exception can be illustrated by a case 
where H and W, desiring to make one $10,000 gift to Charity 
(C) when both of them have died, provide in their wills that 
"if my spouse fails to survive me, I give $10,000 to C." Sup-
pose that H and W are involved in an automobile accident in 
which H dies immediately and that W dies 24 hours later. As 
H has actually predeceased W, C would take $10,000 under 
W's will. As W would be treated as having failed to survive 
H under the new Act's 120-hour rule, C would also take $10,000 
under H's will. To prevent this unintended doubling of C's gift, 
the fourth exception would prevent the 120-hour rule from 
applying. This would result in C taking one $10,000 gift under 
W's will because W was the actual last to die. 
Third Party Liability. 
Because of the relatively short survival period under USDA 
'91, there will be few opportunities for making an inappro-
priate payment. Nevertheless, considerations of basic fairness 
and commercial certainty have resulted in the new Act including 
a protective provision for payors21 and other third parties who 
pay or deliver to an apparent beneficiary in good faith reliance 
upon a governing instrument.28 This protection, which is 
premised on the payor's good faith, ceases to exist after the 
payor has received written notice alleging the beneficiary's 
lack of entitlement. But, to prevent a payor who has received 
such written notice from being caught up in a controversy 
between third parties, the new Act provides for a payor to 
obtain a complete discharge of a liability by making payment 
of the amount in issue into court. 
It has previously been noted that USDA '91 is broader in 
scope than the original 1940 Act. Among other things, the new 
Act expressly includes benefits under a pension, profit-shar-
ing, retirement, or similar benefit plan. However, if such ben-
efit plans are governed by the Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), it has not yet been resolved 
whether or not the provisions of ERISA would supersede a 
state law such as USDA '91. Although there is no ERISA pro-
vision that is in conflict with the provisions of USDA '91, 
ERISA provides that its Titles I and IV "shall supersede any 
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate 
to (emphasis added) any employee benefit plan" that is sub-
ject to ERISA. 29 NCCUSL has gone on record that there should 
be no ERISA supersession in the case in question.30 But, rec-
ognizing that a federal court could find preemption, NCCUSL 
has supplied a two-part remedy for such a possibility. First, 
the new Act provides for the severability of any of its provi-
sions held to be invalid, and the continuing validity of the 
remaining provisions. 31 Second, the new Act provides that any 
person who receives a benefit or payment as a result of a pre-
emption finding is personally liable in the same amount to the 
one who would have received the payment but for the ERIS A 
preemption. 32 
Effective Date. 
As the general rules of USDA '91 are intent-effectuating, 
the new Act seeks to give them the broadest possible applica-
tion. Thus the new Act provides that its presumptions and rules 
of construction apply "to instruments executed and multiple-
party accounts opened before the effective date unless there is 
a clear indication of a contrary intent."33 However, even though 
these rules are intent-effectuating, it is expressly provided that 
they will not have any effect on actions taken, or rights accrued, 
prior to the new Act's effective date.34 In this regard the new 
Act also provides that any right that would be acquired, extin-
guished or barred by the running of any statutory limitations 
period that has begun prior to the new Act's effective date will 
continue to be governed by prior law. 
Conclusion. 
USDA '91 does not alter the results that would presently be 
obtained in cases covered by Virginia's version of the 1940 
Act. However, the scope of the original Act has significantly 
narrowed with advancements in medical science that make it 
possible for the time of death to be determined with much 
greater certainty and thereby to reduce the number of cases 
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"where there is no sufficient evidence that the parties have 
died otherwise than simultaneously." In addition, a realization 
has developed that, even though an intended beneficiary actu-
ally survives the testator, if the period of survival is so short 
that there is neither the opportunity for the beneficiary to per-
sonally benefit from the gift or to make any after-the-fact dis-
position thereof, the testator's intent will normally be better 
served by treating the beneficiary as having predeceased the 
testator. Such an approach will also result in a desirable sav-
ing of administrative time and expense in a number of cases 
and more often result in keeping the testator's property in the 
testator's family. The concept of the 120-hour survival period 
has been in existence since 1969 as a part of the UPC and has 
been found satisfactory for its purpose. In addition to this main 
feature, USDA '91 also provides (i) express coverage of prop-
erty not mentioned in the original, (ii) clarification of the bur-
den and standard of proof, (iii) desirable presumptions and 
rules of construction not found in the original, and (iv) pro-
tection for payors and bona fide purchasers not found in the 
original. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws is to be commended for the substance and 
form of this new uniform act and it is respectfully submitted 
that it should be enacted by the Virginia General Assembly. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. This article was written while the author was serving as chair of 
a committee studying the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (1991) for 
The Virginia Bar Association's Section on Wills, Trusts and Estates. The 
other members of this committee were C. Daniel Stevens, of Christian, 
Barton, Epps, Brent & Chappell, and Harry J. Warthen, III, of Hunton 
& Williams. The author is indebted to these colleagues for their thought-
ful comments and suggestions during the committee's study; however, 
the opinions expressed in this article, and any errors found herein, are 
the sole responsibility of the author. 
2. This is also true for all other donative transfers that are designed 
to become effective in the future but, for purposes of convenience, this 
article will ordinarily refer only to wills, testators and beneficiaries in 
the text. It will be understood, however, that such usage is meant to be 
read in a generic sense as applicable to other donative transfers and the 
parties thereto. 
3. It would be possible to avoid these problems if W's executor 
disclaimed W's inheritance from H, which would then pass directly from 
H to their common beneficiaries. However, the presence of this salvage 
doctrine does not eliminate concern with the underlying problem because 
(i) such use of disclaimers is not a part of the common knowledge pos-
sessed by all lawyers, (ii) approximately seventy percent of Virginia 
estates are administered by laypersons, and (iii) the opportunity to use 
a disclaimer can easily be lost by an act of dominion over the inherited 
property. See Niklason v. Ramsey, 233 Va. 161 (1987). 
4. And, unlike the administrative time and cost problems discussed 
above, there is no potential for salvaging the testator's intent with a dis-
claimer in these cases because of the ultimate taker's conflict of interest. 
5. Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (1991), Prefatory Note (U.L.A.). 
One of the cases cited as an example is Janus v. Tarasewicz, 482 N.E.2d 
418 (Ill. App. 1985). In this case, Hand W returned from their honey-
moon to learn that H's brother had just died. Naturally upset, and unaware 
that the brother's death was due to taking Tylenol spiked with cyanide, 
both H and W took some of the same Tylenol. "(U)pon their arrival at 
intensive care unit of emergency room, neither showed vital signs; hos-
pital personnel never succeeded in establishing in husband any sponta-
neous blood pressure, pulse, or signs of respiration and pronounced him 
dead; hospital personnel did succeed in establishing in wife a measur-
able, though unsatisfactory, blood pressure; although she had very unsta-
ble vital signs, remained in a coma, and had fixed and dilated pupils, she 
was placed on mechanical respirator and remained on the respirator for 
two days before she was pronounced dead; USDA found inapplicable 
because there was sufficient evidence that wife survived husband." Id. 
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The cause of this litigation was H's insurance policy that named Was 
primary beneficiary and H's mother as secondary beneficiary if W failed 
to survive H. The decision in this case resulted in H's insurance being 
paid over to W's estate and, through it, to W's family. 
6. Matter of Bucci, 293 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Surr.Ct. 1968). Following 
a mid-air collision with another plane, Hand W's small airplane crashed 
and burned. H and W were both dead when their bodies were removed 
from the wreckage. Autopsy reports established (i) the presence of car-
bon monoxide in W's blood, (ii) that H had a fractured skull, and (iii) 
the absence of carbon monoxide in H's blood. H's fractured skull and 
the absence of carbon monoxide in his blood indicated instantaneous 
death upon impact, before the fire developed, whereas the presence of 
carbon monoxide in W's blood indicated that she survived impact and 
lived long enough after the fire began to inhale some of the carbon 
monoxide generated by the fire. Accordingly, the court concluded that 
W survived H. 
7. In Re Rowley's Estate, 65 Cal.Rptr. 139 (1967). Twas a pas-
senger in the front seat of an automobile being driven by B. Another 
vehicle struck this automobile with such force that both T and B died 
upon impact. B (the driver) was a beneficiary under the will of T (the 
passenger) and B's gift would fail unless B survived T. B was found to 
have survived T because, as the other vehicle struck the automobile at 
a 90 degree angle on T's side, T received the impact first and, as death 
occurred upon impact, T must have died first. 
8. Vaughn v. United States, 536 F.Supp. 498 (W.D. Va. 1982). Father 
and Daughter were both shot in the same incident. F's Virginia death 
certificate stated that he died at 10:45 p.m. in their home. D's North Car-
olina death certificate stated that she died in the hospital at 11 :58 p.m. 
the same evening. 
9. In this regard, some of the language accompanying the original 
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act is interesting. "It may be a sad com-
mentary, but the pace of modem living [in 1940] with its multiple forms 
of transportation has caused the instances of simultaneous death to occur 
with much greater frequency than in the past." Uniform Simultaneous 
Death Act (1940) Prefatory Note (U.L.A.). Such being true of simulta-
neous deaths in 1940 should be a fortiori true of short-interval deaths at 
the present time. 
10. Assume H and W have standard reciprocal wills naming each 
other as primary beneficiary, as primary executor, and providing that "if 
my spouse and I die as a result of a common tragedy my spouse shall be 
deemed to have predeceased me." Suppose, as a result of an automobile 
accident, H dies immediately but W, though grievously injured, lingers 
on and perhaps appears to be recovering for a period of weeks or months 
before finally succumbing. What is to be done, vis-a-vis H's estate dur-
ing the period of W's overlife? 
Suppose, in a further case, H dies immediately and W, though sur-
viving, receives such overwhelming injuries that W's death occurs there-
from ten months later. Have H and W both died as a result of the common 
tragedy where their deaths are separated by such a lengthy period? 
(Hint-Could W's personal representative bring a wrongful death action 
against the driver of the motor vehicle whose negligence caused the 
tragedy?) Suppose in this case W has already administered H's estate 
and received (and perhaps transferred some of) H's assets? Note that H's 
estate would not be entitled to the marital deduction in this case as a 
result of using this common tragedy provision, unless its operation was 
limited to a maximum of six months after H's death. I.RC.§ 2056(b)(3). 
11. Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (1991) (U .L.A.) Copies of the 
Act may also be obtained from the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, 676 North St. Clair Street, Suite 1700, 
Chicago, Illinois 60611. Copies of the 1993 technical amendments will 
likely be available only from the National Conference in the immediate 
future. USDA '91 is based upon the 1990 revision of the Uniform Pro-
bate Code's Article II. The new Act's fidelity to its source has resulted 
in a recommendation that "( s )tates that enact Sections 2-104 and 2-702 
[of the UPC] need not enact the USDA as revised in 1991 and should 
repeal the original version of the USDA if previously enacted in the 
state." Uniform Probate Code § 2-702, Comment (U.L.A.). 
12. Uniform Probate Code§ 2-104 (intestate succession) and§ 2-601 
(wills) (U.L.A.). 
13. Id.,§ 2-702 (U.L.A.). 
14. Va. Code Ann.§§ 64.1-97 through 64.1-104. 
15. In joint bank accounts between persons not married to each other, 
the parties own in proportion to their deposits in the account. Va. Code 
Ann. § 6.1-125.3. In the stereotypical case of older person depositing 
all of the monies and placing younger person's name thereon so that, if 
necessary, younger person can reach the monies on older person's behalf 
(and a further intent in some cases for the younger person to become the 
account's owner at older person's death), it cannot be said that there is 
a joint tenancy between older person and younger person because younger 
person has no ownership rights during older person's lifetime. 
16. "'Governing instrument' means a deed, will, trust, insurance or 
annuity policy, account with POD designation, pension, profit sharing, 
retirement, or similar benefit plan, instrument creating or exercising a 
power of appointment or a power of attorney, or a donative, appointive, 
or nominative instrument of any other type." Uniform Simultaneous 
Death Act (1991) § 1(2) (U.L.A.) This definition is identical to that found 
in U.P.C. § 1-201(19), except for the U.P.C. 's inclusion of "security reg-
istered in beneficiary form (TOD)," following the reference to POD 
accounts. Several of the 1993 Technical Amendments to USDA '91 were 
made for the purpose of extending its applicability to TqD transfers but 
the definition of "governing instrument" was left unchanged. 
17. '"Co-owners with right of survivorship' includes joint tenants, 
tenants by the entireties, and other co-owners of property or accounts 
held under circumstances that entitles one or more to the whole of the 
property or account on the death of the other or others." lJniform Simul-
taneous Death Act (1991) § 1(1) (U.L.A.). This definition could, per-
haps, be improved by deleting the present reference to "accounts" and 
adding, immediately preceding "joint tenants," the language "parties to 
a joint account." This language would more clearly encompass both 
kinds of joint account, i.e., those where the parties are joint owners and 
those where they are not. 
18. Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (1991) § 2 (U.L.A.), which is 
applicable to intestate succession and other statutory rights. This rule is 
not applicable if it would result in an escheat. Corresponding primary 
rules are found in § 3 and § 4. Section 3, which is applicable to dona-
tive provisions in governing documents, provides that "an individual 
who is not established by clear and convincing evidence to have sur-
vived an event, including the death of another individual, by 120 hours 
is deemed to have predeceased the event." Section 4, which is applica-
ble to co-owners with right of survivorship, provides that "if (i) it is not 
established by clear and convincing evidence that one of two co-own-
ers with right of survivorship survived the other co-owner by 120 hours, 
one-half of the property passes as if one had survived by 120 hours and 
one-half as if the other had survived by 120 hours and (ii) there are more 
than two co-owners and it is not established by clear and convincing evi-
dence that at least one of them survived the others by 120 hours, the 
property passes in the proportion that one bears to the whole number of 
co-owners." The applicability of§§ 3 and 4 is subject to four exceptions 
found in § 6, discussed later in the text. 
19. This part of the Act, presented as two separate provisions, suf-
fers from a lack of parallelism. For example, § 5(3) dealing with records 
or reports specifically refers to those of "domestic or foreign" entities 
but there is no such reference in § 5(2) dealing with death certificates. 
The failure to draft these provisions in parallel form could lead to uncer-
tainty and litigation when, for instance, a "foreign" death certificate is 
offered. It is respectfully submitted that the differences in these two pro-
visions should be eliminated by harmonizing amendments. They present-
ly read as follows: 
(2) A certified or authenticated copy of a death certificate purporting 
to be issued by an official or agency of the place where the death pur-
portedly occurred is prima facie evidence of the fact, place, date, and 
time of death and the identity of the decedent. 
(3) A certified or authenticated copy of any record or report of a gov-
ernmental agency, domestic or foreign, that an individual is missing, 
detained, dead, or alive is prima facie evidence of the status and of the 
dates, circumstances, and places disclosed by the record or report. 
20. This provision is significantly broader than present Virginia law 
which provides as follows: 
Copies of records of this Commonwealth, of another state, of the 
United States, of another country, or of any political subdivision or agency 
of the same, other than those located in the clerk's office of a court, shall 
be received as prima facie evidence provided that such copies are authen-
ticated to be true copies both by the custodian thereof and by the person 
to whom the custodian reports. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-390. 
This code section, which creates the "official written statements" 
exception to the hearsay rule, "does not extend to statements not with-
in the personal knowledge and observation of the recording official." 
Smith V. Woodlawn Construction Co., 235 Va. 424, 431(1988). USDA 
'91 would partially negate the restriction of the Smith Case and permit 
the document's relevant facts regarding death or status to be introduced 
into evidence even though they are not within the personal knowledge 
or observation of the recording official. An enumeration of the relevant 
facts that would be admissible will be found in the preceding footnote. 
21. Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (1991) § 6(1) (U.L.A.). 
22. Id. 
23. Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (1991) § 6(2) (U.L.A.). Under 
the new Act it is necessary that the expression of actual intent be found 
within the particular "governing instrument" in question. In this regard 
one aspect of present Virginia law is broader. Va. Code Ann. § 64.1-102, 
dealing with insurance policies, allows an insured to negate USDA by 
appropriate language in the contract of insurance or in the insured' swill. 
Query-Is this statutory right to negate USDA by a provision in the 
insured's will an "incident of ownership" under IRC § 2042? 
24. In order for a decedent's estate to be entitled to a marital deduc-
tion it is necessary that the property in question pass to a surviving spouse. 
Thus, if the evidence shows that the surviving spouse failed to survive 
the decedent there can be no marital deduction. Suppose, however, the 
actual order of deaths cannot be determined? I.R.S. Reg.§ 20.2056(e)-
2( e) provides in part that "(i)f the order of deaths of the decedent and 
his spouse cannot be established by proof, a presumption (whether sup-
plied by local Jaw, the decedent's will, or otherwise) that the decedent 
was survived by his spouse will be recognized ... " Although presum-
ing the spouse's survival might seem contrary to the administrative effi-
ciency argument noted in the beginning of this article, the economic gain 
realized by obtaining the marital deduction in these cases (followed by 
the utilization of the surviving spouse's exemption equivalent and/or 
lower estate tax rates) will outweigh the extra administrative costs incurred 
by passing the same property through two separate estates. 
Although it can be assumed that the new Act intends to recognize a 
reverse presumption, the express words of the second exception focus 
on language requiring or not requiring survival of "an event, including 
the death of another individual, by any specified period." However, many 
lawyers drafting reverse presumptions will have used the language of 
the l.R.S. regulations in order to achieve certainty of tax result. That lan-
guage refers to deaths under circumstances "where the order of deaths 
... can not be established by proof," which does not compare very favor-
ably with the language of the second exception. Thus, notwithstanding 
the assumed general intent, consideration might be given to inserting 
the language of this l.R.S. regulation into the first exception for the sake 
of specificity. If this insertion is made, it will also be necessary to exclude 
this insertion from the operation of the first exception's second condi-
tion, "and that language is operable under the facts of the case." The rea-
son for this exclusion can be illustrated by the following case. H's will 
makes a gift to W that is intended to qualify for the marital deduction if 
at all possible. Thus H's will provides that if H and W die under cir-
cumstances where the order of their deaths cannot be established by 
proof, W shall be deemed to have survived. Suppose H and W are in an 
automobile accident in which H dies immediately and W dies several 
hours later. If the second condition of the first exception ("and that lan-
guage is operable under the facts of the case") applies to this case, the 
gift to W will fail and there will be no marital deduction. Thus, although 
the second condition of the first exception should clearly apply to the 
ordinary cases, as noted in the text, it should not be applicable when the 
tax-oriented language is used. 
Lastly, consideration might also be given to adding a "catch-all" pro-
vision to the first exception for the benefit of those estates where it is 
clear that (a) the marital deduction was desired, (b) application of the 
120-hour rule would result in its loss, and (c) no specific exception to 
the rule is applicable. A redraft of the first exception, in light of the com-
ments in this footnote, might read as follows: 
§ 6. Exceptions. 
Survival by 120 hours is not required if: 
(1) the governing instrument contains language dealing 
explicitly with (i) simultaneous deaths or deaths in a common 
disaster and that language is operable under the facts of the case. 
(ii) deaths under circumstances where the order of death can-
not be established by proof or (iii) the marital deduction, or 
contains a provision to or for the benefit of decedent's spouse 
where it is decedent's intent, as manifested from the governing 
(Continued on page 23) 
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... Not surprisingly, we do not all agree as to what 
degree of either perceived injustice or predicted 
inconvenience will arise from the adoption or rejec-
tion of a given ruling. Sometimes we differ sharply 
and even passionately as to the acceptability of a 
ruling under scrutiny. At this level, there can sim-
ply be irresoluble differences of opinion ... (Pages 
233-34.) 
He does not suggest, however, that precedents or statutes or 
adherence to strict rules of logic are unimportant. Those mat-
ters, too, find their place, along with a stern charge to consid-
er the societal and institutional consequences of the rule that 
you advocate, as the judges certainly will do. The point, rather, 
is that judges base their decisions on a seemingly infinite array 
of relevant (and sometimes irrelevant) considerations, and that 
advocates who would persuade must factor the entire array 
into their presentations. 
What, then, is a lawyer to do? How are you to know (or even 
to make an intelligent guess) what is likely to persuade the 
judges who will hear your case? Judge Aldisert answers, 
Know the court! Know this court! Know the court 
that will be reading your briefs! ... 
Find out how the judges react to the controlling gen-
eral principles involved in your case ... Read their 
opinions with the view oflearning something about 
their societal concerns, political preferences, eco-
nomics hypotheses, behavioral interests, sociologi-
The New Simultaneous Death Act 
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instrument or external evidence, that decedent's estate receive 
the benefit of the federal estate tax marital deduction; 
25. Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (1991) § 6(3) (U.L.A.). 
26. Id., at § 6( 4 ). 
27. "'Payor' means a trustee, insurer, business entity, employer, gov-
ernment, governmental agency, subdivision, or instrumentality, or any 
other person authorized or obligated by law or a governing instrument 
to make payments." Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (1991) § 1(3) 
(U.L.A.). This definition is identical to the one found in Uniform Pro-
bate Code§ 1-201(34) (U.L.A.), except for the addition of "instrumen-
tality." 
28. Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (1991) § 7(a) (U.L.A.). Sim-
ilarly, a bona fide purchaser "who receives a payment or other item of 
property (from an apparent beneficiary) in partial or full satisfaction of 
a legally enforceable obligation" is also protected, but a gratuitous trans-
cal bias or prejudice and jurisprudential idiosyn-
crasies (for example, are they slaves to precedent or 
do they perceive the court as an instrument of social 
change?) ... 
... Have they written any law review articles? Have 
they made any speeches before bar groups or at law 
schools? ... (Pages 230-32.) 
In short, work hard! Do your job! The job is not simple or easy, 
to be sure; and you often cannot bill your clients for all of the 
time that you spend on such matters. But it is a part of your 
professional calling and of your duty to your clients, as well 
as to the courts before whom you practice and to the legal sys-
tem as a whole. And be assured that if you choose not to fol-
low this advice, but adhere instead to a practice of 
color-matching of precedents to facts, you will be left behind 
by your professional colleagues who aspire to ever-higher stan-
dards of practice; you will lose some cases that might have 
been decided your way; and in the long run, your practice, 
your professional reputation, your client base, and your income 
will suffer as a result. If you choose to take the "road less trav-
elled," however, this book will help to locate some important 
landmarks along the way. 
((Ruggero J. Aldisert is a Senior Judge (and former Chief 
Judge) of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
George A. Somerville is a partner with Mays & Valentine, in 
Richmond.)) 
feree from the apparent beneficiary is liable to make full restitution. Id., 
§ 7(b)(l). 
29. Section 514(a) ofERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
30. NCCUSL's position is set forth in Uniform Probate Code§ 2-804, 
Comment (U.L.A.). 
31. Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (1991) § 11 (U.L.A.). 
32. Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (1991) § 7(b)(2) (U.L.A.). 
Although initially this remedy itself may also appear to be subject to 
preemption for the same reasons, there is a significant difference between 
the general rule and the alternative remedy. Under the general rule one 
is in conflict with a plan administrator, which is a subject of ERISA's 
concern; whereas under the alternative remedy the plan administrator is 
not involved, there is simply a controversy between two third parties 
that has no impact upon the plan administrator. This distinction was rec-
ognized, on other facts, by the Virginia Supreme Court in Brown v. 
Brown, 244 Va. 319 (1992). 
33. Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (1991) § 12(b)(2) (U.L.A.). 
34. Id., at§ 12(b)(l). 
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